Purpose: This paper examined the efficiency of Indian banks and the interrelationships between insolvency risk, capital and efficiency.
Introduction
The banking system in India plays an important role in the development of the financial system and the economy as a whole. Since the 1990s, India has gradually implemented bank reforms towards deregulation to reduce default risk and improve efficiency of Indian banks. India adopted the Basel Accord on capital standards: Basel I in 1992 and Basel II in 2009; the minimum capital to risk weighted asset ratio (CRAR) was set to 8% by 1995 and 9% by 2000 for commercial banks (Sarma and Nikaidō, 2007) . However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no comprehensive studies examining effects of these reforms. This motivates us to investigate the interplay between capital ratio, default risk and operational efficiency of Indian banks since early 1990s.
The literature is scant on the interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency, but most of these studies are on European or the U.S. banks. Several studies on the efficiency of Indian banks, but only one study by Das and Ghosh (2004) examining the association between risk, capital and efficiency in Indian banks has been identified. However, this study covered only public banks; considered only cost efficiency; and analysed a short period 1992 to 1999. We analyse both cost and profit efficiency and examine effects of the scale and technological progress, and hence, provide a more comprehensive picture about the efficiency of the Indian banking system in the post-reform period. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first examination of the interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency for the whole Indian banking system as well as its bank types. Our study is also the first to predict the managerial behaviours in Indian banks and to assess if they vary across bank types.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the framework of the management behaviour and the related literature. Section 3 discusses research methodology.
Section 4 analyses empirical results and section 5 draws conclusions and addresses policy implications.
Managerial hypotheses and Literature review

Managerial hypotheses
Four managerial hypotheses have been identified by Berger and DeYoung (1997) : bad management, bad luck, skimming and moral hazard. The possible relationship between risk, capital and efficiency provides evidence of the management behaviour a bank exhibits as summarized below.
Bad management is identified if a decrease in cost efficiency temporarily precedes an increase in the level of risk. Banks with poor senior management may fail to control operational costs and monitor borrowers, hence, increase risk and then lower cost efficiency.
Such banks also tend to have poor loan and investment portfolios, causing low revenue efficiency. In order to improve the low economic efficiency, these poorly managed banks tend to take additional risks, leading to a growth in insolvency risk.
Bad luck has the reverse temporal ordering to bad management: an increase in risk occurs before a reduction in economic efficiency. One possible explanation is that when exogenous events, like regional economic downturns, worsen asset quality and then fuel insolvency risk, bank managers must allocate additional resources, like personnel on monitoring loans and seizing and disposing of collateral, to remedy this adverse situation. As a consequence, banks incur additional operating costs and lose some income, leading to the deterioration of cost and profit efficiency.
Moral hazard is identified if a reduction in capital ratio in the poorly capitalized banks leads to a growth in risk. This is because banks which are suffering risks due to low capital suffer more risks due to the declined capital ratio, thereby facing moral hazard incentives to take risky portfolios. Under this hypothesis, we expect that a reduction in financial capital precede an increase in non-performing loans.
Skimping behaviour is identified if an increase in cost efficiency temporarily precedes an increase in insolvency risk, which is an opposite sign to the bad management behaviour despite having the same temporal order. The possible reason is that banks tend to skimp on operating costs by reducing credit monitoring, collateral valuing and marketing activities to become more economically efficient. However, the improvement in economic efficiency due to the skimping may be achieved only in the short term, since the consequences of skimping are the deterioration in the quality of loans and investments, resulting in greater insolvency risk.
Literature review
The literature on bank efficiency in India is vast (Das and Ghosh, 2004; Das et al., 2005; Sensarma, 2005; Das and Ghosh, 2009; Kalluru, 2009; Ray and Das, 2010; Das and Drine, 2011; Sahoo and Mandal, 2011; Wanniarachchige and Suzuki, 2011; Kumar, 2013; Reddy and Nirmala, 2013) , but only one study (Das and Ghosh, 2004) examined the interrelationships between risk, capital and cost efficiency in Indian public banks in the 1992-1999 period. The authors found that capital ratio reduced bank risk, while cost efficiency had no effect on bank risk and capital ratio. Moreover, an increase in bank risk led to a decrease in cost efficiency while capital ratio had no effect on banks' efficiency. Other studies documented conflicting results on the efficiency trend, efficiency gap between public banks and private banks, and the effects of capital ratio and risk on economic efficiency. For example, Das et al. (2005) found an increase in the profit efficiency, while Sensarma (2005) and Wanniarachchige and Suzuki (2011) found a reverse trend. Kalluru (2009) and Wanniarachchige and Suzuki (2011) found a declining trend in cost efficiency while Sahoo and Mandal (2011) found an increasing trend. Indian public banks were found to be more cost-efficient than private banks in the studies by Sahoo and Mandal (2011) , Wanniarachchige and Suzuki (2011) , but comparably cost-efficient in the study by Das and Drine (2011) , and less profit-efficient than private banks in the study by Sensarma (2005) .
The effects of capital ratio on profit efficiency were positive in the study by Reddy and Nirmala (2013) , but negative in the study by Das and Ghosh (2009) , while there was no association between cost efficiency and capital ratio in the study by Kalluru (2009) 
The number of international studies, mostly on European or U.S. banks, on the interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency are also limited: Tan and Floros (2013) , Fiordelisi et al. (2011), Deelchand and Padgett (2010) , Altunbas et al. (2007 ), Williams (2004 , Berger and DeYoung (1997) , and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) . Main findings of these studies predicted bad management behaviour in European banks (Williams, 2004; Fiordelisi et al., 2011) , Japanese cooperative banks (Deelchand and Padgett, 2010) , and the U.S. banks (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997) . Bad luck and moral hazard behaviours were found in Japanese cooperative banks (Deelchand and Padgett, 2010 ) and the U.S. banks (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997) . Skimping behaviour was predicted in European banks (Altunbas et al., 2007) and the U.S. banks (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) . Banks with more capital were found to suffer less risk in China (Tan and Floros, 2013 ) and the U.S. (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997) , but capital was found to have no significant impact on risk in European banks (Williams, 2004; Fiordelisi et al., 2011) . Better capitalized banks were found to operate more cost-efficiently in Europe (Fiordelisi et al., 2011) , but less efficiently in Japan (Deelchand and Padgett, 2010) . In Europe, more costefficient banks were better capitalized (Fiordelisi et al., 2011) , and took less risk (Altunbas et al., 2007) , but reverse stories were found in Japan (Deelchand and Padgett, 2010 ) and the U.S. (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997) .
Overall, the literature seems to provide conflicting signs and temporal order of interrelationships between capital, risk and operational efficiency of banks. One may argue that, these results reflect differences in: choice of variables, sample size, analysis periods and estimation methods. However, Berger and DeYoung (1997) suggested that inverse signs and temporal orders may simply reflect different managerial behaviours (e.g., bad luck, bad management, skimping, and moral hazard). One possible way to differentiate these behaviours is to estimate the interrelationships between risk, capital and operational efficiency simultaneously as a system.
Methodology
Efficiency estimation
We apply a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) approach proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) to estimate cost and profit efficiency scores. We adopt the transcendental logarithm (translog) functional form since it is more flexible and provide desired properties (e.g., monotonicity and asymmetry) to decompose changes in technical efficiency into components of interests such as technological progress and returns to scale (Berger and Mester, 1997; Huang et al., 2010; Košak and Zorić, 2011) . To take into account effects of environmental factors, we apply the technical efficiency effects SFA model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) . Also, the efficiency component was assumed to follow a truncated distribution, and technological changes were proxied by a time trend (t).
We follow the intermediation approach, which views a bank as an intermediary between depositors and borrowers, to specify inputs and outputs. Based on data available, the production of banking services in this study involves two outputs -net loans (Y1) and other earning assets (Y2)-and three inputs -fund (X1), fixed assets (X2) and personnel (X3). Therefore, prices of inputs X1-3 are financial capital price (W1), physical capital price (W2) and labour price (W3), respectively.
The translog stochastic cost frontier to estimate cost efficiency for the panel data is as follows:
where the subscript i denotes the cross-sectional dimension across banks, subscript t denotes the time dimension. Parameters α, β,  and γ of the cost function captures the unknown technology of the banking system and is estimated by maximum likelihood method. TC is the observed total cost, which consists of interest expenses, other operating expenses and personnel expenses. The error term v represents the statistical noise, while the error term u accounts for the non-negative cost inefficiency, which is assumed to have truncated-normal distribution and to be independent of v.
By exploiting the linear homogeneity condition, this model is transformed into a cost function by normalizing the dependent variable and all input prices by the price of input 3 (W3) as follows (subscripts i and t are dropped for ease of viewing):
We define SFA profit function in a similar manner: replacing the notation of total costs (TC) by that of the profit before tax (PBT), and making the inverse sign for the non-negative component of the error term u. We also transform the original profits, which have negative values, by subtracting the minimum and adding the mean to ensure the validity when taking a natural logarithm.
The individual cost and profit efficiency scores are calculated, respectively, as CEit = exp (-uit) and PEit = exp(-uit). CE and PE will range from 0 (very poorly operate banks) to 1 (bestpracticed banks).
Economies of scale
To examine effects of operational scale on costs and profits, we respectively estimate cost elasticity ( ) and profit elasticity ( ) by taking the derivatives of the transformed function with respect to all output variables as follows (note that the transform function is assumed to follow the monotonicity assumption, hence the cost elasticity can be calculated by taking derivatives to output):
An estimate of less than, equal to, or greater than one respectively indicates increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale. The respective three categories of scale economies for a profit function are defined by having less than, equal to, or greater than zero.
Technological progress
To investigate the effects of technological progress on costs and profits of banks, we calculate cost elasticity ( ) and profit elasticity ( ) with respect to time (t) as follows:
Technological progress is defined as having negative time derivatives for cost function (i.e., reduces costs over time) and positive time derivative for profit function (i.e., increases profits over time). Technological regresses occur if the derivatives are negative (for the profit function) and/or positive (for the cost function) while neutral technological changes occur if the derivatives are equal to zero.
Interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency
We employ the three-stage least squares (3SLS), introduced by Zellner and Theil (1962) , to investigate the interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency as in the study by Tan and Floros (2013) . Some other approaches in the literature are two-stage least squares (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Deelchand and Padgett, 2010) , seemly unrelated regressions (SUR) (Altunbas et al., 2007) , Granger causality tests (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004; Fiordelisi et al., 2011) , and decomposing technical efficiency into operating efficiency and risk management efficiency (Yang, 2014) . However, results obtained by the Granger causality are sensitive to model specification and the number of lags. Also, the efficiency decomposition approach required data on non-performing loans which we cannot obtain.
Therefore, we select the 3SLS estimator, which combines the two-stage least squares and SUR, for our study.
We measure bank risk by Z-score, efficiency by the technical efficiency scores of cost and profit functions, and capital by the ratio of equity to total assets. Z-score is computed by the ratio of return on assets (ROA) plus the capital ratio divided by the standard deviation of ROA, which measures the degree of bank insolvency (Roy, 1952) . The choice of Z-score as a risk measure was applied in various studies by Tan and Floros (2013) , Beck et al. (2013) , Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Houston et al. (2010) , Laeven and Levine (2009) and many others. The literature also exists other measures of risk such as ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans (Williams, 2004; Tan and Floros, 2013) , ratio of loan loss reserves to total assets (Altunbas et al., 2007; Deelchand and Padgett, 2010) , ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Das and Ghosh, 2004; Fiordelisi et al., 2011) , and 1 or 5-year expected default frequency (Fiordelisi et al., 2011) . However, the later approach (expected default frequency) requires data on stock prices while many Indian banks do not have public traded securities. The three former measures (loan loss/total loans, loan loss/assets, and non-performing ratio) are subject to managerial discretion and capture only credit risks, while non-lending earning assets accounts for approximately 40% of the outputs of Indian banks. Hence, Z-score is more appropriate for measuring bank risk in our study.
The system of simultaneous equations is defined as follows:
where R is the measure of risk (proxied by Z-score), E is efficiency, C is capital, A is assets (in log), RD is revenue diversification, LD is the ratio of loans to deposits, LA is ratio of loans to assets, G is GDP growth rate, I is inflation rate,; ,  and  are random errors. These variables are described in more detail in Table 1 . Because the Z-score is highly skewed, we use the natural logarithm of the Z-score to make its distribution more normal. Based on hypotheses explaining the relationships between bank risk, capital and efficiency proposed by Berger and DeYoung (1997) above, bad management, skimping, bad luck, and moral hazard behaviours can be tested by the sign and significant level of parameters 1
(positive), 1 (negative), 1 (positive), and 2 (positive), respectively (bearing in mind that a higher Z-score indicates that the bank is more stable). In particular, a positive 1 confirm that a reduction in cost/profit efficiency precedes an increase in bank risk (i.e., bad management occurs) whilst a negative 1 suggests an increase in cost/profit efficiency happens just before an increase in risk (i.e., skimping exists). The positive parameter 1 is interpreted as an increase in risk precedes a reduction in cost/profit efficiency (i.e., banks face bad luck). The moral hazard hypothesis tests whether low capital leads to risky behaviour of bank managers, which represents by the positive parameter 2. We focus this test to banks with low capital that moral hazard is more likely to occur. We expect that capital is negatively affected by operational efficiency, thus parameter 1 is expected to have a negative sign.
In order to check the sensitivity of results on bank management behaviour, we also use two alternative risk measures: volatility of returns on asset (ROA) and volatility of returns on equity (ROE), which are respectively measured by standard deviation of ROA and standard deviation of ROE. A higher volatility of ROA or ROE indicates that the bank is less stable.
Data
Indian commercial banks are divided into three categories based on ownership criteria: public 
Empirical results
Operational efficiency
To assess the validity of model, we conduct a Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test, which is defined as:
, where is the log likelihood of the unrestricted model and is the log likelihood of the restricted model. The test statistics, which follows the  2 (n) distribution with n being the number of restrictions, for the cost and profit models were 133.57 and 64.29, respectively. In our case the number of restrictions is 1 (i.e., u=0), hence the null hypothesis of no efficiency is rejected at 1% level of significance. Return to scale India benefits from increasing returns to scale regarding profits. experienced a steadily increasing trend and is above zero (except private banks in the years 1994-1997) and elasticity of public banks is consistently higher than that of private banks. Thus, Indian banks in the sample, regardless of bank types, have increased profits at an increasing rate from expanding loans and investments over the study period, and public banks outperform their private counterparts in this aspect.
Technical efficiency
Figures 5-6 show the yearly-mean cost and profit efficiency of the Indian banking system and its bank types while Table 3 (i.e., banks can reduce costs by 5%, and increase profits by 6.6%, compared with best practices). This overall cost and profit efficiency levels are similar to the studies by Sensarma (2005) and Kalluru (2009) . The results show that public banks are more cost-efficient, which is similar to the studies by Sahoo and Mandal (2011) and Wanniarachchige and Suzuki (2011) . But these banks are slightly less profit-efficient, which is consistent with the study by Sensarma (2005) . Specifically, public banks have comparable cost efficiency to private banks in the 1994-1998 period, but they have greater cost efficiency in the remaining period. Profit efficiency of public banks is lower in years 1999-2001, 2004-2005 and 2010, but comparable to private banks in the remaining years. Moreover, there is a significant and negative association between cost and profit efficiency scores, but the magnitude is weak (the correlation coefficient is -0.11 and has a p-value of 0.005). One possible explanation is that bank' managers practice both bad management (low efficiency leads to high risk) and moral hazard (low capital leads to high risk) behaviours. For example, banks with low capital may focus more attention to cost saving (i.e., improve costs efficiency) and take more risks damaging reputation and profits (i.e., decline profit efficiency). results show that an increase in profit efficiency leads to an increase in insolvency risk with the exception of private banks, hence supporting the skimping hypothesis. These contrary behaviours could be due to the presence of moral hazard behaviour, which explains a negative correlation between the cost and profit efficiency scores discussed above. We found that moral hazard behaviour does exist as expected and more detailed results on the test for moral hazard are presented at the end of this section.
Interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency
Better capitalized banks are found to suffer less insolvency risk when both bank types are combined. This finding is consistent with that of Tan and Floros (2013) for Chinese banks and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) for the U.S. banks. When capital is increased, the shareholders of private banks -individuals and organizations -tend to have more incentives to monitor the management performance than those of public banks -all citizens with the government being their representative. This leads to the fact that the negative effect of capital ratio on insolvency risk is significant in private banks, but insignificant in public banks.
There is an inverse U-shape relationship between bank size (proxied by total assets) and risk when both bank types are combined, suggesting that Indian banks intensify risk management activities when their total assets exceed a certain level. Revenue diversification in Indian banks seems to reduce the insolvency risk, as non-interest income is less vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks.
Regarding Equation 2, a decrease in cost efficiency is found leading to an increase in capital ratio in Indian banks, which aligns with studies by Deelchand and Padgett (2010) and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) for the U.S. banks. Banks often respond to a deterioration in cost efficiency by raising capital (numerator of capital ratio) as a precautionary step, while public banks respond to profit efficiency improvement by using their retained earnings as a supplement to equity (numerator of capital ratio). Ratio of loans to deposits is found to be positively and significantly related to capital ratio irrespective of bank ownership and efficiency measurement. One possible explanation is that banks with higher intermediation of deposits into loans have higher earnings to supplement the equity (numerator of capital ratio). The results also show that an increase in GDP growth leads to a decrease in capital ratio in public banks, but it is only significant at 10% and only occur in the cost function. This could be because public banks expand lending and investment when the economy is in a good shape (e.g., GDP growth increases, unemployment decreases), resulting in an increase in total assets, which is the denominator of capital ratio. An increase in inflation rate is associated with a decrease in capital ratio in public banks, but an increase in this ratio in private banks.
We argue that when inflation grows, public banks may still expand lending for the purpose of improving the economy under the influence of the government, while private banks can reduce lending (a main source of denominator of capital ratio) due to higher probability of loan default.
Results for Equation 3
show that Z-score creates positive and significant impacts on the cost efficiency of public banks (i.e., an increase in risk leads to a significant decrease in cost efficiency). This finding supports the bad luck hypothesis in the Indian public banks.
However, this finding is not significant when a profit function is analyzed, which could be due to the negative and significant relation between cost efficiency and profit efficiency. An increase in capital ratio is found to temporally precede a decrease in cost efficiency, but a reverse sign occurs at the profit aspect. Banks which raise equity as a funding source for loans usually involve higher costs, but they generate higher revenue than those relying on income from deposits (Berger and Mester, 1997) . Revenue diversification is found to have a negative effect on cost efficiency of Indian banks with the exception of public banks. This could be because the expenses for non-lending products are greater than those for lendingproducts, and private banks tend to intensify revenue diversification more than public banks.
The ratio of loans to total assets is found to be associated positively with cost efficiency, but negatively with profit efficiency. One possible explanation is that loans are increased by lowering both deposit and lending interest rates, but the decreased interest expenses (paid to depositors) do not offset the reduced interest incomes (received from borrowers). GDP growth is found to decrease cost efficiency and increase profit efficiency of Indian banks (except public banks). This could be because in a better economy, the demand for loans is higher while the supply for deposits is lower, so banks spend additional costs to mobilize funds for loans and hence, interest income is offset. However, private banks could be more dynamic in this business than public banks, so effects of increased funding cost are not significant in public banks.
Inflation is found to decrease cost efficiency of public banks, but decrease profit efficiency of private banks. One possible explanation is that when inflation grows, public banks still expand loans under the influence of the government while private banks reduce lending, so public banks suffer higher loan losses than private banks. However, the income generated from lending expansion in public banks offset the loans losses; thereby profit efficiency of public banks is not affected by inflation. We test the moral hazard hypothesis by re-estimating the system of equations 1-3 for the subsample of banks with the capital ratio below the sample median. Results of Equation 1 show that the capital ratio creates a positive effect on Z-score irrespective of the efficiency measurement (see Table 5 ). In other words, a decrease in capital leads to an increase in the risk of insolvency, supporting the moral hazard hypothesis.
Robust tests of managerial hypotheses by other risk measures
In order to have robust inferences on the managerial behaviour in Indian banks, we reestimate the system of the three simultaneous equations for the samples of all banks, public banks, private banks, and low capitalized banks by using the two alternative measures of risk:
volatility of ROA and volatility of ROE. Partial results of these re-estimations are presented in Table 6 . For convenience in comparison, we also put partial results of the system of three simultaneous equations when risk is measured by Z-score. Note that a higher Z-score indicates that the bank is more stable while a higher volatility of ROA or ROE indicates that the bank is less stable. It can be seen that findings remain robust when risk is measured by the volatility of ROA and volatility of ROE. In general, findings on managerial behaviour in Indian banks are similar to those of Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) for US commercial banks which were found to exhibit bad management, bad luck, skimming and moral hazard behaviour; those of Williams (2004) and Fiordelisi et al. (2011) for European banks which were found to be affected by bad management; those of Deelchand and Padgett (2010) for Japanese cooperative banks which were found to exhibit bad management, bad luck and skimping; and those of Das and Ghosh (2004) for Indian public banks which were found to show bad luck.
Conclusion and policy implication
We used stochastic cost and profit frontier models to comprehensively assess the efficiency of 40 Indian banks during the 1994-2011 period. We found that the average cost and profit efficiency scores are 0.950 and 0.934, respectively. Public banks are more cost-efficient, but slightly less profit-efficient than private banks, and with the efficiency experiencing an unclear trend over the study period. Indian banks benefit from technological progress and scale expansion in reducing costs and increasing profits. Further, we employed three-stage least square estimation for the system of three simultaneous equations to investigate the relationships between risk, capital and efficiency. We found that a decline in cost efficiency is generally followed by an increase in insolvency risk ("bad management"). A decrease in capital ratio is generally followed by an increase in the insolvency risk ("moral hazard"). In public banks, a rise in insolvency risk is generally followed by a decline in cost efficiency ("bad luck") while an increase in profit efficiency temporarily precedes an increase in the insolvency risk ("skimping"). Better capitalized banks suffer lower insolvency risk and achieve higher profit efficiency. Each of these results have a small impact on banks on average, but may have a considerable impact on individual banks that are most subject to bad luck, bad management, skimping and/or moral hazard.
These findings may have some policy implications. The bad management evidence in both public and private banks suggests that bank regulators and supervisors should consider cost efficiency as a good predictor of risky banks. The bad luck in public banks evidence implies that bank regulators and supervisors should limit public banks' exposures to external shocks by diversifying income streams or restricting loan to assets ratio. The skimping hypothesis in public banks suggests that bank regulators and supervisors should consider profit efficiency as a proxy for insolvency risk in public banks. The moral hazard hypothesis implies that bank regulators and supervisors should carefully monitor capital ratio in the low capitalized banks in order to require them to quickly raise this capital when it declines. The finding that capital ratio has a negative effect on the risk of insolvency, but a positive effect on profit efficiency suggests that capital ratio could be an efficient tool to reduce the insolvency risk and improve the profit performance.
